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A reform of Italian co-operative law was passed in 2003 and came into force in 2004. 
This paper presents the principal characteristics of the new Italian co-operative law 
and seeks to evaluate the relationship of some of its main provisions to traditional co-
operative  principles.  From  this  perspective,  the  paper  deals  in  particular  with  the 
definition  of  the  Italian  co-operative  as  a  company  with  a  “mutual  purpose”;  the 
distinction between “mainly mutual” co-operatives and “other” co-operatives (and the 
relationship between mutuality and profit-making in co-operatives); the regulation of 
voting in the assembly (the “one member, one vote” principle and its exceptions); the 
available governance systems (“tripartite”, “dualistic”, “monistic”); and co-operative 
finance  solutions  (investor  members  and  financial  instruments).  Using  the  Italian 
reforms  as  a  starting  point  for  debate,  this  paper  puts  forth  the  possibility  of 
generalising a modified approach to co-operative regulation and principles, taking into 
account efficiency issues, while preserving the co-operative identity. 
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This paper has an aim that might appear rather narrow, that is, to give a general 
overview of the new Italian co-operative law, by dwelling upon its most particular and 
innovative points pursuant to the reform of 2004.
1 
 
However, this is a task that is neither simple (since Italian co -operative law, even 
after  the  reform,  remains  difficult  to  understand  and  allows  fo r  different 
interpretations), nor trivial for two main reasons. 
 
Firstly, it would be useful to create a global and integrated system of research in the 
co-operative field, reflecting the existing co-operative model of political representation 
and economic  integration. The philosophy that inspires the 6
th  ICA  principle  (“co-
operation among co-operatives”) should apply to co-operative studies (“co-operation 
among  co-operative  scholars”),  because  the  strengthening  of  the  co-operative 
movement, which this ICA principle wishes to implement, would be highly favoured by 
the co-operation among scholars from different countries.
2 
 
This is particularly true for Europe, given that many questions which have arisen 
there, for example the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of tax benefits awarded 
to co-operatives by some Member States, such as Italy, and whether this special 
treatment is a state aid forbidden under art. 87, paragraph 1, of the EU Treaty ,
3 
require a unified approach. Common answers and shared thoughts  as to the identity 
of  a  co -operative  and  its  specific  features  compared  to other  forms  of  company 
(commercial or lucrative ones), especially in terms of its suitability to the production 
of  socio-economic  benefits  for  the  community  (what  economists  call  “positive 
externalities”) are necessary. 
 
We should not take it for granted that the concept of a co-operative is self-evident or 
that  the  difference  between  co-operatives  and  for-profit  companies  is  universally 
                                                 
1 Legislative decree 17 January 2003, n° 6, modified the section of the Italian civil code dealing with co-operatives and other 
companies. In Italy, the general regulation of companies, including co-operatives, is part of the civil code. 
2  “Co-operatives  serve  their  members  most  effectively  and  strengthen  the  co-operative  movement  by  working  together 
through local, national, regional and international structures”. 
3 In 2008 the European Commission asked the Italian government about tax privileges awarded to consumer co-operatives in 
banking and distribution sectors, with particular regard to their compatibility (in light of state aid prohibition) with the  E.U. 
Treaty, when these privileges are awarded to consumer co-operatives (not “mutual” co-operatives or “social” ones), which 
are direct competitors of commercial enterprises. In the preliminary phase of this inquiry the Commission considered tax 
deduction from the co-operative’s taxable income of profits earmarked for reserves incompatible with the Treaty if these 
profits come from the activity with non-members, unless earmarking is prescribed by law (mandatory reserves) or the co-
operative  is  a  small-medium  enterprise;  in  addition,  the  Commission  considered  tax  abatement  on  interest  granted  to 
members for loans to their co-operative incompatible, for in such cases members do not act as members but as third parties 
with respect to their co-operative; on the other hand, the Commission considered tax deduction from the co-operative’s 
taxable income of profits awarded to members as “patronage refunds” to be compatible, to the extent that these profits stem 
from transactions with members: see letter E1/2008 in http://www.coopseurope.coop/spip.php?rubrique292. On this point, 
see the reaction of Co-operatives Europe: position paper, 6 October 2008, ibidem, where the argument of the relevance of the 
distinction between big and small-medium co-operatives (also with respect to the greater or smaller member participation to 
the governance of the co-operative) is substantially criticised, as well as that of the relevance of the exclusive or predominant 
mutuality  principle,  and  it  is argued  that  these  measures are  only  compensatory for  co-operatives;  see  also  the  papers 
presented  at  the  international  seminar  “Co-operative  enterprise  between  national  taxations  and  European  market”, 
organised by Euricse, the 11-12th September 2008, in Trento, in http://www.euricse.eu/it/node/44. 
Art. 87 of the EU Treaty stipulates: “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State, awarded 
by Member States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the common market”.   4 
 
 
recognised. In fact, there is still a lack of visibility of the co-operative sector of the 
economy. 
 
Therefore, the first step a researcher who aims to be part of such a network should 
take,  would  be  to  diffuse  the  knowledge  of  one‟s  own  national  legislation  (which, 
moreover, is in many countries, as in Italy, complex and scattered between general 
laws,  sometimes  integrated  into  civil  codes,  sometimes  not,  and  special/sectorial 
laws; between civil laws and tax laws; etc.), and to introduce other researchers to its 
sources  and  main  characteristics,  thus  making  a  comparative  analysis  possible.
4 
Secondly, the new Italian co -operative law offers a good “test case” to discuss and 
evaluate  the  relationship  between  legislation  and  promotion  of  co-operatives. 
Recognising law as an instrument of policy, we may consider “does the law reinforce 
or  hinder  co-operatives?”;  “does  it  take  into  account  the  benefits  brought  by  co-
operatives to the community?”; and so on. 
 
Therefore, some features of the Italian legislation are suitable for this kind of analysis, 
and will be the main topics of this paper. 
 
In particular, the paper will focus on: 
  the definition of a co-operative under Italian law and the “mutual purpose” as 
the key element of this definition; 
  the  distinction  between  “mainly  mutual”  and  “other”  co-operatives  (and  the 
relationship between mutuality and profit-making); 
  the regulation of voting in members‟ assemblies (the “one member, one vote” 
principle and its exceptions); 
  the available governance systems (“tripartite”, “dualistic”, “monistic”); 
  co-operative finance solutions (investor members and financial instruments). 
 
As for each of these issues, the paper also aims to evaluate their relationship with ICA 
co-operative  principles  and  to  understand  whether  and  to  what  extent  they  divert 
from them; to identify the reasons for their adoption; and to determine whether such 
measures presuppose and introduce a new co-operative norm. 
 
In presenting Italian law from the methodological perspective above, the paper will 
make  comparative  references  to other national  co-operative  laws,
5  and to the SCE 
Regulation as well. Although this Regulation only creates a European cross -border 
form of company (the SCE) and hence, does not intend to harmonise Member States‟ 
co-operative laws, it is relevant due to the strong effect it has had on recent European 
national  laws,  as  we  shall  see  examining  the  Italian  reform.  As  sought  by  the 
European  Commission,  this  may  therefore  result  in  an  indirect  approximation  of 







                                                 
4 Sharing this view, EURICSE, with two other European partners (Co-operatives Europe and the Spanish Ezai Foundation), is 
going  to  start  a  year-long  research  financed  by  the  European  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the  European  co-
operative society ( “SCE”) Regulation in the 27 Member States (and 3 EEA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) by 
establishing a network of 30 national experts in co-operative law, coordinated by a scientific committee made up of six 
experts from different countries. Results are expected by the end of 2010. 
5 This comparison will be limited to the general co-operative laws of France, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Poland, Malta, Hungary 
and Norway. 
6 See COM(2004) 18, On the promotion of co-operative societies in Europe, p. 10.   5 
 
 
2. The Italian (and European) context 
 
Before going deeply into the legal analysis, it is useful to begin by offering some brief 
background  data  on  Italian  co-operatives.  It  is  an  unquestionable  fact  that  co-
operative law, as a consequence of its particular subject matter, reflects the historical, 
political, economic and social, as well as legal, context in which it exists, more than 
other company laws. We have evidence of this in the existing variation of co-operative 
legislation in European states. 
 
We can begin by affirming that Italy  is a country with a high concentration of co-
operatives, as the tables annexed to this paper show. Italy is not characterised by a 
particular type of co-operation, as all its forms and patterns are present. There are 
worker co-operatives and consumer and production (among entrepreneurs) ones as 
well.  Co-operatives  operate  in  every  sector  of  the  economy  (from  agriculture  to 
banking, with a strong presence in the sectors of commercial distribution, construction 
and services, especially social). There are both large and small co-operative models 
(where  a  consortium  associating  small  co-operatives  carries  out  particular 
entrepreneurial functions in their interest), with the latter prevailing over the former. 
There is a co-operation with Catholic origins (the so called “white” co-operation) and 
one  derived  from  socialist  inspiration  (the  so  called  “red”  co-operation):  both  are 
headed by a representative organisation (commonly known as “centrali cooperative”), 
Confcooperative  and  Legacoop  respectively.  Other  minor  national  organisations  are 
AGCI, UNCI e UNICOOP. The province of Trentino  is an exception, where only one 
representative organisation operates (the “Federazione Trentina delle cooperative”).
7 
 
There are two main characteristics of  Italian co-operation: a strong propensity to 
create and consolidate a (political and economic) connection among co -operatives 
(which, as we shall see, is recognised and sanctioned by law), and the consciousness 
of an existing link between co-operation and social utility (which is recognised in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Italy and has represented one of the reasons for the 
recourse by Italian legislators to the co-operative form in order to introduce the first 
legal form of social enterprise: the social co-operative).
8 
 
The second background datum is a legal-political one. It is important to highlight that 
in the Italian legal system co-operative enterprises are not on the same level as the 
other enterprises, as they are recognised in, and protected  by,  the Constitution, 
where  the  basic  values  of  our  community  are  acknowledged,  safeguarded  and 
promoted. The Italian Constitution deals expressly with the economy in article 41 ff.  
Article 41, after having affirmed that  “private  economic  initiative  is  free”,  further 
qualifies it by saying that “it cannot be carried out against social utility or in a way 
that hinders security, freedom and human dignity”. 
 
On the other hand, with regard to the co-operative enterprise, article 45 states that 
“the Republic recognises the social function of co-operation with mutual character and 
without private speculation purposes. The law promotes and favours its growth with 
the most appropriate means, and ensures, with appropriate controls, its character and 
purposes”. 
                                                 
7 However, these organisations are not only political in the strict sense, as, through organisations controlled by them, they 
run the mutual funds for the growth and promotion of co-operation; these funds are variously nourished by the associated 
co-operatives (they are obliged to allocate 3% of the annual surplus to the funds; and their assets are allocated to the funds in 
the event of winding-up and transformation). 
8 See Law, 8 November 1991, n° 381.   6 
 
 
Thus, in the Italian legal system, a possible conflict between the enterprise as a whole 
and social utility is acknowledged, while a social function is ascribed only to the co-
operative  enterprise.  The  co-operative  is  the  only  type  of  enterprise  which,  being 
under  the  constitutional  umbrella,  can  never  be  obliterated  (unless  there  is  a 
Constitutional revision), and, moreover, must be favoured by Italian legislators. This 
is  not  an  isolated  case,  as  a  reference  to  co-operatives  is  also  present  in  the 
Constitutions of Spain, Portugal, and Hungary.
9 
 
The acknowledgment of co -operatives by the Italian Constitution is subject to two 
conditions: mutual character (a feature of Italian co -operative law discussed below) 
and the absence of private speculation purposes. Although art. 45 of the Constitution 
does  not  deal  with  governance  issues,  many  Italian  scholars  hold  that  the 
constitutional acknowledgment of the co-operative form is due to the fact that it is an 
institution of economic democracy, representing  “one  of  the  ways  to  allow  worker 
participation  in  the  “economic  organisation”  of  the  country”,  and  therefore  in  the 
“shaping  of  political  life”  and  the  “exercise  of  sovereignty.”
10  In  this  way,  the  co-
operative institution may contribute to the implementation of the social reform project 
Italian legislators envisaged and called for in art. 3, para. 2, of the Constitution.
11 
 
This  interpretation  is  extremely  topical  from  a  political  point  of  view,  since  the 
European Commission has also expressed its view that co-operatives contribute to the 
development of knowledge (being “schools of entrepreneurship and management” for 
the members, notably the workers, who take part in their activities),
12 and also that 
they are the most appropriate and least disruptive legal form for the t ransfer of an 
enterprise that has no hope of continuing in its present form. In these cases, the 
ownership of the company may be transferred to the workers, the very people who 
have a huge interest in its survival and good knowledge of the sector in which  they 
operate, and who otherwise would not have the required financial means to acquire 
the enterprise but for the fact that they were organised within a co-operative.
13 
 
The  last  background  datum  is  of  political -institutional  nature  and  relates  to  the 
European  policy  towards  co -operatives.  In  communication  COM(2004)  18,  of  23 
February 2004,  on the promotion of co-operative societies in Europe, the European 
Commission  maintains  that  “co-operatives  are  an  excellent  example  of  a  company 
type  which  can  simultaneously  address  entrepreneurial  and  social  objectives  in  a 
mutually reinforcing way,”
14 and recognises their “increasingly important and positive 
roles… as vehicles for the implementation of many Community objectives in fields like 
employment  policy,  social  integration,  regional  and  local  development,  agriculture, 
etc.”
15  Hence,  the  growth and  promotion of  co-operatives  in Europe  has  become  a 
European government policy, though, in light of this, the more recent expression of 
                                                 
9 See Art. 61 of the Portuguese Constitution; art. 129 of the Spanish Constitution (expressly, as the Italian, obliging legislators 
to promote co-operatives), and art. 12 of the Hungarian Constitution. 
10 GALGANO, sub Art. 41, in Commentario della Costituzione, Branca (ed.), Rapporti economici, t. II, Bologna-Roma, 1982; see 
also NIGRO, sub art. 45, ibidem. 
11 “It is the responsibility of the Republic to remove the obstacles of an economic and social nature that, by limiting de facto 
the  freedom  and  equality  of  the  citizens,  prevent  the  complete  development  of  the  human  person  and  the  effective 
participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country”. With great shrewdness and 
political-institutional awareness, Italian legislators were therefore conscious of the fact that the legislative recognition of 
formal equality and the prohibition of discrimination were not sufficient to guarantee the exercise of fundamental rights in 
the absence of the material means required to exercise these rights. 
12 See COM(2004) 18, cit., point 2.1.1. 
13 See COM(2004) 18, cit., point 2.3.1. These considerations should be taken into great account in this time of economic 
recession. 
14 See COM(2004) 18, cit., point 4. 
15 See COM(2004) 18, cit., point 1.2.   7 
 
 
doubt by the Commission as to the compatibility with competition law of the national 
measures advantaging co-operatives seems contradictory.
16 
 
A co-operative is, therefore, at the European level as well, a legal form of company 
which may be distinguished from other enterprises by the fact of  the combination of 
economic  and  social  aspects,  as  clearly  stated  in  the  Italian  Constitution,  which 
specifically ascribes a social function to co-operatives.
17 The background set out above 
shows that in Italy, as well as in Europe, the co -operative assumes, among the 
various types of company, a particular role and position due to its social nature. The 
co-operative becomes an economic player which public institutions can or, rather, 
should refer to for the implementation of their general interest policies.   Such  an 
environment allows for a specific regulation of co-operatives that both recognises their 
specificity, and, precisely on these grounds, promotes and strengthens them. 
 
 
3. “Mutual purpose” as the objective of the Italian co-operative 
 
New  art.  2511  of  the  civil  code  (hereinafter  “c.c.”),  defines  the  co-operative  as  a 
company  “with  variable  capital  and  mutual  purpose”.  The  variability  of  capital  is  a 
requirement which is embodied in almost all the legislation on co-operatives,
18 and 
represents the technical way to implement the 1
st ICA principle (“voluntary and open 
membership”).
19 In contrast, “mutual purpose” is a distinctive (not included, to the 
best of the author‟s knowledge, in any other laws) and traditional formula of Italian 
law (in the civil code since 1942 and in the Constitution of 1948). 
 
However, even though the legislative formula is unique, the “mutual purpose” of the 
Italian co-operative is an objective not substantially dissimilar from that which other 
European  national  laws,
20  the SCE R egulation,
21  and ICA principles assign to co -
                                                 
16 n 3 above. However, to be more precise, one must point out that this doubt is not general, but regards only some measures 
and only those in favour of some types of co-operatives. 
17  It is known, moreover, that European institutions include co -operatives, together with associations, foundations and 
mutuals, in the category of the so-called “social economy organisations”: see recently COM(2008) 412, of 2 July 2008, where 
co-operatives are more precisely qualified as “social economy enterprises”. 
18 See, among others, art. 13, para. 1, French law n° 47/1775; articles 2, para. 1, and 18, para. 1, Portuguese co-operative code 
n° 51/96; chapter 1, sec. 2, of the Finnish law n° 1488/2001; chapter 1, sec. 7, of the Hungarian law of 2006; art. 1, para.  2, 
SCE Regulation: “the number of members and the capital of an SCE shall be variable” 
19 Admittance and exclusion of members do not determine a structural modification of the co-operative and therefore do not 
require any modification of the act of incorporation or the statute (the number of members may freely varies during the co -
operative’s existence). The 1st ICA principle states: “co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons able to use 
their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious 
discrimination”. 
20 In some European national laws, the obligation for a co-operative to operate with its members arises a contrario from the 
express prohibition (which, moreover, has its exceptions) to operate with non-members, since in effect the prohibition to 
operate with non-members is the result of the obligation to operate with members, so implementing the mutual purpose: see 
for example art. 4, para. 1, Spanish law n° 27/99; art. 2, para. 2, Portuguese co-operative code; art. 3, para. 1, French law n° 
1775/47, and also SCE Regulation at art. 1, para. 4: “An SCE may not extend the benefits of its activities to non-members or 
allow them to participate in its business except where its statute provide otherwise”. For a positive definition, see the specific 
statement of sec. 56 of Hungarian law of 2006, which talks about “modes of personal involvement of members”, specifying 
that this personal involvement may be realised “by way of production, processing products, and preparation for marketing, 
sales, consumption or by other means”, and that “one mode of personal involvement … is the obligation to perform work”. But 
see also the recent Norwegian Co-operatives Societies Act of 29 June 2007, at sec. 1, para. 2: “by a co-operative society is 
meant a group whose main objective is to promote the economic interest of its members by the members taking part in the 
societies as purchasers, suppliers or in some similar way”. And sec. 2 of Finnish law n° 1488/2001: “the purpose of a co-
operative shall be to promote the economic and business interests of its members by way of the pursuit of economic activity 
where the members make use of the services provided by the co-operative or services that the co-operative arranges through 
a subsidiary or otherwise. However it may be stipulated in the rules of the co-operative that its main purpose is the common 




22 Under Italian law a co-operative is a type of company whose objective is 
to satisfy a common interest of its members by making contracts/transactions with 
them. These transactions are of diverse lega l nature and subject matter, depending 
on the typology of the co -operative (employment contracts in worker co -operatives; 
exchange contracts in consumer or producer co-operatives). 
 
In addition to the company relationship, there is a distinct, though relat ed, mutual 
relationship (of work or exchange) through which the co -operative implements the 
imposed legal function, namely the mutual purpose. A member is, therefore, both 
member of the company, having subscribed its capital, and its counterpart within the  
mutual relationship (of work or exchange).  
 
On the basis of several arguments, it is implicitly admitted by scholars that the 
purpose of a co-operative is not only to enter into a contract with its members, but 
also  to  make  these  contracts  the  most  profi table  for  the  members  (that  is,  its 
counterparts), obviously as long as it is compatible with the economic equilibrium of 
the enterprise.
23 This “mutual” advantage may be awarded to members immediately 
at  the  time  of  contract  or  subsequently  (once  the  company  accounts  have  been 
approved  and  there  is  a  surplus  to  allocate)  as  “patronage  refunds”.  Scholars  and 
courts,  moreover,  agree  on  the  fact  that  members  are  not  entitled  to  this  mutual 
advantage. Their interest is only indirectly protected (through the power to substitute 
managers;  sue  them  for  liability,  etc.).  Italian  law  adds  and  specifies  that  in  the 
establishment  and  execution  of  these  mutual  operations  a  co-operative  shall 
guarantee the equal treatment of members (art. 2516, c.c.), and assign patronage 
refunds to members in proportion to the quantity and quality of mutual exchanges 
(art. 2545 sexies, para. 1, c.c.). 
 
Having said this, the difference between  co-operatives and for-profit companies (i.e. 
companies acting for a lucrative purpose, namely, with the end of first making and 
then distributing profits to shareholders in proportion to the subscribed capital) comes 
out clearly. The latter act for remunerating the capital subscribed by their members 
(and  shareholders),  and  not  to  advantage  them  through  (and  in  proportion  to) 
exchanges. 
 
However,  in  light  of  this,  we  cannot  deny  that  a  co-operative,  like  for-profit 
companies,  is  a  company  which  acts  in  the  interest  of  its  members,  and  that  the 
common interest of members might also be financial, even though technically non-
lucrative (i.e., in the remuneration of the subscribed capital).
24 For this reason, some 
Italian scholars, thereby provoking at times the reaction of representatives of the co -
operative  movement,  argue  that  the  co -operative  is  an  orga nisation  pursuing  a 
“selfish” or “internal” (in relation to members‟ interests), though non-lucrative, aim. 
This position, perhaps, ignores the fact that co-operatives are obliged, at least under 
                                                                                                                                                                  
21 According to art. 1, para. 3, of the SCE Regulation, “an SCE shall have as its principal object the satisfaction of its members’ 
needs and/or the development of their economic and social activities, in particular through the conclusion of agreements 
with them to supply goods or services or to execute work of the kind that the SCE carries out or commissions”. 
22 In fact, in the 1st principle it is said that co-operatives are organisations open to all persons “able to use their services”; the 
3rd principle allows, among the possible allocations of profit, a co-operative to benefit members “in proportion to their 
transactions with the co-operative”. 
23 By way of contrast, this is explicitly stated in the opening of French law n° 1775/47, whose article 1 assigns to co -
operatives the main purpose of  reducing the price of goods and services sold to members and of improving the quality of 
goods and services offered to them (namely, to act in their interest).  
24 Accordingly, in defining a co-operative, a widespread formula in Europe, especially in the most recent laws, is that the co -
operative is a company set up to satisfy members’ economic, as well as social, cultural, or other needs: see sec. 7, Hungarian 
law of 2006; along this line also art. 3, loi sur les co-operatives of Québec.   9 
 
 
Italian  law,  to allocate a  great  amount  of the  surplus (33%)  to the  satisfaction of 
interests  unrelated  to  their  members  (see  the  regulation  of  reserves  and  other 
compulsory destinations), so that the pursued aim should be more correctly defined 
as both selfish and altruistic, internal and external.
25 At any rate, with regard to the 
aims pursued by an organisation, a difference between mutuality and solidarity must 
be drawn, as shown by the fact that a specific legislative measure (the law n° 381/91) 




Indeed, even though the mutual purpose itself contains elements of sociality (as a co-
operative does not seek to remunerate the  subscribed capital, but to satisfy needs of 
a different nature, and even though at times these needs may a ppear financial, in 
reality they are predominantly social ),
27 it would not be appropriate to identify this 
aim  with  the  pure  and  exclusive  “altruistic”  purpose  which  characterises  non-profit 
organisations  and  social  enterprises  (and  social  co-operatives  within  this  latter 
category), and which relates to the satisfaction of the common interest and not of 
members‟ needs as such. 
 
In this regard, it is worth underlining that the 5
th and the 7
th ICA principles are not 
followed by Italian law, which does not oblige co-operatives to allocate resources to 
the  protection  and  promotion  of  members‟  human  needs  and  to  the  sustainable 
development  of  the  community.
28  The observance of these principles mostly takes 
place on a voluntary basis (namely, as a form of corporate social responsibility, as far 
as this concept presupposes the voluntary, therefore not compulsory, adoption of 




4. “Mainly mutual” and “other” co-operatives 
 
Italian law not only ascribes a mutual purpose to the co-operative (art. 2511, c.c.) 
and states that transactions with non-members are allowed only if provided by the 
statute  of  the  co-operative  (art.  2521,  para.  2,  c.c.),  but  also  determines  the 
minimum  quantity  of  mutual  transactions,  that  is  the  minimum  value  of  the  ratio 
between  transactions  with  members  and  transactions  with  non-members  (if  any). 
                                                 
25  This  debate  is  topical  at  the  European  level,  especially  now  that  in  many  countries  measures  introducing  “social 
enterprises” have been passed (“social enterprise” in Italy and in Finland; CIC in England; SFS in Belgium). What is the 
relationship between co-operative and social enterprises? What makes these two subjects different? In effect, there is a 
widespread worry in certain co-operative circles as to whether social enterprise might obfuscate in the eyes of public opinion 
the intrinsic sociality of the co-operative enterprise. On this point, see FICI, Co-operative and social enterprises: comparative 
and legal profile, forthcoming in Roelants (ed.), Co-operatives and social enterprises. Governance and normative frameworks, 
CECOP, 2009. 
26 Before Law 381/91, in fact, some Italian courts refused to register co -operatives whose declared aim was to act in the 
general interest of the community, and not in the interest of their members. 
27 For example a co-operative made up of small producers from developing countries; or of disadvantaged workers; etc. But 
also consider the role of the co-operative form in the transfer of (family or under financial crisis) enterprises, highlighted by 
the European Commission in the quoted communication of 2004. 
28 The 5th ICA principle, titled “Education, training and information” stipulates: “Co-operatives provide education and training 
for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of 
their co-operatives. They inform the general public - particularly young people and opinion leaders - about the nature and 
benefits of co-operation”. 
According to the 7th ICA principle, titled “Concern for community”, “Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of 
their communities through policies approved by their members”. 
29 See the Commission’s definition in COM(2001) 366, Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility: “a 
concept  whereby  companies  integrate  social  and  environmental  concerns  in  their  business  operations  and  in  their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”.   10 
 
 
However,  the  question  should  not  be  put  in  this  manner;  it  needs  to  be  better 
articulated. 
 
The reform has in fact introduced a distinction that makes the Italian legal system, to 
the best of the author‟s knowledge, unique in the world with regard to this profile. 
It is the distinction, among co-operatives, between “mainly mutual” co-operatives and 
“other” co-operatives (that is, co-operatives which do not meet the requirements to 
be included in the first category and therefore are “other”). 
 
“Mainly mutual” co-operatives are characterised by two elements: 
  they must operate predominantly with their members; 
  they  can  remunerate  the  capital  subscribed  by  members  only  to  a  certain 
extent. 
 
“Other” co-operatives are not subject to these restraints: they can freely operate with 
non-members and they can freely remunerate the capital. Nonetheless, they remain 
“co-operatives”, although, being “other”, they are not eligible for tax benefits (though 
they are eligible for other benefits). The first restraint regards the business of the co-
operative:  the  mainly  mutual  co-operative  must  operate  (exclusively  with,  or  at 
mimimum) predominantly with its members: workers, consumers or providers. 
 
The condition of predominancy must be analytically documented in the “integrative 
note” to the balance sheet, by underlining the following parameters (see art. 2513, 
c.c.): 
a)  in consumer co-operatives, sale proceeds from members‟ consumption must be 
superior to 50% of total sale proceeds; 
b)  in worker co-operatives, labour costs for members‟ jobs  must be superior to 
50% of total labour costs; 
c)  in  production  co-operatives,  manufacturing  costs  for  goods  and  services 
provided by members must be superior to 50% of total manufacturing costs. 
 
In agricultural co-operatives, the condition of predominancy exists when the quantity 
or  the  value  of  the  products  conferred  by  members  is  superior  to  50%  of  total 
quantity or value of products. 
 
Special types of co-operatives, as, for example, social co-operatives, are automatically 
considered  “mainly  mutual”,  leaving  the  condition  of  predominancy  out  of 
consideration  (with  the  consequence  that  they  are  automatically  eligible  for  tax 
benefits). 
 
Ministerial decrees may introduce other exceptions to the condition of predominancy 
as provided by article 2513, c.c. As to the capital remuneration restraint, art. 2514, 
c.c., states that mainly mutual co-operatives: 
  cannot distribute dividends on the subscribed capital superior to the maximum 
interest of postal bonds increased by 2.5 points;
30 
                                                 
30 This limit regards “dividends”, that is, an amount provided as capital remuneration, but does not apply to “patronage 
refunds”, namely, an amount provided as and in proportion to the transactions with the co-operative. Italian law does not set 
limits  for  the  provision  of  patronage  refunds,  although:  co-operatives  should  distribute  patronage  refunds  only  after 
deduction of the compulsory allocations (30% to the legal reserve, and 3% to mutual funds); only the surplus stemming from 
the business with members (and not that coming from the business with non-members) should be refunded; and some 
special  laws  could  limit  the  payment  of  patronage  refunds  (this  is  the  case  of  Italian  law  n°  142/2001  on  worker  co-
operatives, which sets the limit of 30% of the salary). For the SCE regulation on this point, see articles 65-67. See also Art. 58, 
para. 4, of Spanish co-operative law and the 3rd ICA principle where the distinction between dividends and patronage refunds   11 
 
 
  cannot distribute reserves to user-members (that is, co-operators); 
  cannot remunerate the financial instruments subscribed by user-members more 
than the maximum interest of postal bonds increased by 4.5 points; 
  shall  return,  in  all  cases  of  dissolution,  all  their  assets,  subtracting  paid-up 
capital,  to  the  mutual  funds  for  the  promotion  and  development  of  co-
operation; 
  can  assign  to  withdrawing  members  only  the  paid-up  capital,  or  a  smaller 
amount in case of capital loss. 
 
The mainly mutual co-operative image is that of a co-operative transacting with its 
members (even if only predominantly) and subject to a cap on the remuneration of 
the subscribed capital, and therefore substantially conforming to the 3
rd ICA principle
31 
and to other European national laws.
32 Though the SCE Regulation, on the other hand, 
provides  that a return on subscribed capital and quasi -equity is allowed only after 
deduction of the allocation to the legal reserve (art. 65) and the payment of dividends 
(art. 66),
33 it does not set precise limits to  the said return, giving the SCE‟s statute 
the power to regulate this issue (see art. 67)). 
 
As  already  mentioned,  the  above-described  restraints  do  not  apply  to  “other”  co-
operatives, which are obliged neither to have a minimum number of transactions with 
members  nor  to  limit  the  distribution  of  dividends  on  capital  (this  limit  may  be 
provided  by  the  statute).  Furthermore,  they  can  distribute  reserves  and  assets  to 
withdrawing members and in the case of dissolution.
34 
 
Accordingly,  “other” co-operatives, either  due  to the  first aspect  (transactions  with 
members) or the second (limited remuneration of capital), are co-operatives which 
contrast with the co-operative norm stemming from ICA principles. This conclusion 
does not concern governance aspects, since, in this respect, no difference exists in the 
Italian regulation between mainly mutual and other co-operatives. The reasons for the 
legislative choice to create the category of “other” co-operatives are not clear. 
 
Some scholars argue the only reason for this was to prevent many (normally large) 
co-operatives, which used to operate de facto without limit with non-members, from 
being excluded from co-operation after the reform came into force. As a result, the 




                                                                                                                                                                  
emerges clearly when it states that “limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed” and “benefiting members in proportion 
to their transactions with the co-operatives”. 
31 “Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a condition of membership”. 
32 See, among others, Art. 48 para. 2, Spanish Law on co-operatives; art. 14, French Law on co-operatives. 
33 Although Art. 66 of SCE Regulation literally refers to “dividends”, it emerges clearly from its contents that it is dealing with 
“patronage refunds”. 
34 They can moreover convert into a for -profit type of company, which mainly mutual co -operatives are not allowed to do, 
unless they previously lost this quality (but in this case they are obliged to allocate their assets into indivisible reserve s, 
although an opinion of the Central Commission f or co-operatives, a consulting public body, affirms that in this case co -
operatives shall devolve their assets to mutual funds) (see art. 2545  octies, c.c.). The mainly mutual co-operative loses its 
quality if it either does not comply with the requirements in articles 2513 for two financial years in succession or it modifies 
its statute removing non-lucrative clauses. In case of conversion, co-operatives shall devolve their assets, subtracting paid-up 
capital increased (if necessary) up to the minimum capital which Italian company law requires for the setting up of the legal 
form into which the co-operative converts (€ 120,000 in the case of an s.p.a., which is the maximum required) (see Art. 2545 
undecies, c.c.). 
35 See BELVISO, ‘Le co-operative a mutualità prevalente’, in Abbadessa & Portale (eds.), Il nuovo diritto delle società, vol. 4,  
Torino, 2007, p. 653.   12 
 
 
However, this issue has not yet been sufficiently explored by Italian scholars. Indeed, 
softening the rules of mutual purpose and limited distribution of profits can solve the 
biggest problem an ordinary co-operative faces, that is to say, undercapitalisation. If a 
co-operative  can  freely  operate  with  non-members  and  remunerate  the  subscribed 
capital,  the  possibility  to  make  profits  for  both  the  co-operative  and  for  members 
multiplies, and the investment in a co-operative becomes more attractive. 
 
Therefore, the reform makes a new legal form available, namely a new sub-type of 
co-operative, which is more market-oriented and can in theory survive by generating 
its own means without needing a preferential tax treatment (which, moreover, could 
not be awarded to “other” co-operatives given the constitutional provision of art. 45) 
or  other  specific  financial  measures.  In  this  sense,  “other”  co-operatives  lie  in-
between (mainly mutual) co-operatives and for-profit companies. 
 
However, the following questions arise: 
  whether this legislative option will be exploited: “other” co-operatives are, in 
fact, subject to the same governance rules as the mainly mutual ones (“one 
member, one vote”; public control; etc.), and, given this, one could ask what 
incentives there would be to set up a co-operative instead of an ordinary for-
profit and investor-driven company; the point is that the co-operative type of 
governance makes sense (and is economically rational) only in the presence of 
a company with a mutual and non-lucrative purpose; 
  whether the category of “other” co-operatives may threaten and undermine the 
image of co-operation: indeed, the force which drives “other” co-operatives is 
capital since they may not have user-members, but only investor-members, or 
at  least  members  who  are  not  interested  in  the  activity  itself,  but  in  the 
remuneration  of  capital;  but  “other”  co-operatives  remain  co-operatives, 
participate  in  the  co-operative  movement,  and  can  receive  public  benefits 
different from tax benefits; thus the judgement on their behaviour  might be 
extended to co-operation in general (“other” co-operatives are not obliged to 
act in a certain way, namely, in the interest of consumers, workers, producers, 
regardless of whether they are members or not: if they were obliged to do so, 
the judgement on their social function would be definitely positive, maybe even 
more positive than for “mainly mutual” co-operatives, which may act only in the 
interest of their members, preferring them to non-members).
36 
 
The reform of Italian law  does not consider separately   the case of a co -operative 
which  does  not  operate  predominantly  with  its  members ,  is  limited  by  a  profit 
distribution  restraint,  and  pursue s  the  interests  of  its  consumers,  workers, 
counterparts. Yet, this type of co -operative might have a social impact even greater 
than the mainly mutual one, for it  broadens  the area  of beneficiaries. But, given 
                                                 
36 It is very significant in this regard what the president of the sub-commission for the reform of Italian co-operative law has 
affirmed after the reform approval: “it is very difficult to identify the social function (and the meritorious character) of a co-
operative which does not act with and in favour of its members, and which has a dominantly, though imperfect, lucrative 
nature” (see BASSI, Profili generali della riforma delle cooperative, in Il nuovo diritto delle società, vol. 4, cit., p. 575). On the 
other  hand,  the  same  scholar  points  out  elsewhere  that  “mutual  purpose  gives  co-operatives  a  particular  meritorious 
character when mutuality is direct to the implementation of particularly significant economic needs (making reference to the 
qualities of members or the type of services provided by the co-operative), as mutuality can be neutral, inexpressive, … or 
even speculative” (BASSI, sub art. 2511, in Società cooperative, Presti (ed.), Milano, 2006, p. 6), and moreover “pure mutuality 
does not necessarily correspond to social function. Pure mutuality … is not a sure index of sociality. The value of a co-
operative lies in the activity it performs, in the economic conditions of the mutual exchange, in the needs it satisfies, in the 
categories of citizens and economic operators it sustains, in the diffuse welfare it promotes, and not in the rules on the 
governance  of  the  organisation  (equality,  “open  door”)  inspired  by  principles  of  democracy.  By  way  of  contrast,  pure 
mutuality regards the containment of lucrative purpose, which has not a value per se, but at best as an index of a value placed 
elsewhere” (ibid., p. 17).   13 
 
 
Italian legislation, this type of co-operative, being not mainly mutual, would not be 
eligible for tax benefits.
37 
 
5. Voting rights. The principle “one member, one vote” and its exceptions 
 
Under Italian law, “each member has a vote” in the co-operative assembly, regardless 
of the amount of the subscribed capital (art. 2538, para. 2, c.c.). Therefore, in a co-
operative, voting is not linked to shares (as it is in the regulation of other forms of 
company), but membership per se on principle. 
 
The  traditional  principle  of  co-operative  democracy  stemming  from  this  rule  has 
therefore been confirmed by the Italian reform of 2004. This principle is followed by 
other European national laws
38 and the SCE Regulation,




The principle is directly related to the specific aim of the co -operative to satisfy the 
common interest of its members, and is one of the governance aspects determining 
the social function of co-operatives. Indeed, the social importance of the principle of 
democracy is evident if we consider that not only does this make the co-operative an 
instrument that satisfies people‟s needs and aspirations, rather than the interests of 
capitalists, but above all, it encourages the participation of everyone in the control 
and  the  running  of  the  enterprise,  making  the  co-operative  the  “school  of 
entrepreneurship  and  management”  referred  to  in  the  abovementioned  European 
Commission Communication, or even the instrument of economic democracy alluded 
to in the Italian Constitution. 
 
However, the Italian reform provides a few exceptions to the rule “one member, one 
vote”  and  in  this  sense,  it  goes  beyond  the  ICA  principles,  where  an  exception  is 
allowed only for secondary (second degree) co-operatives (co-operatives among co-
operatives), though these must still maintain a democratic manner of organisation.
41 
This is not surprising since almost all European national laws contain exceptions to the 
                                                 
37 Yet, one must notice that many of these co-operatives are social co-operatives under law n° 381 of 1991 and therefore 
automatically eligible for tax benefits. 
38 See, for example, Art. 9, para. 1, French law n° 1775/47: “Chaque associé dispose d’une voix ￠ l’assemblée générale”; Art. 51, 
para. 1, Portuguese co-operative code, law n° 51/96: “Na assembleias-gerais das cooperativas de primeiro grau, cada 
cooperador dispõe de um voto, qualquer que seja a sua participação no respectivo capital social”; Art. 26, para. 1, 
Spanish law n° 27/99: “En la asemblea general cada socio tendrá un voto”; sec. 23, para. 1, Hungarian law n° X/2006: “Each 
member shall have one vote in the general meeting”; Sec. 38, para. 1, Norwegian law of 29 June 2007: “Each member has one 
vote at the annual meeting”. 
By way of contrast, other laws allow general exceptions to this principle, sometimes without indicating any criteria for the 
division of votes or limits; see chap. 4, sec. 7, Finnish law n° 1488/2001, which, after stating that “in the general meeting of 
the co-operative, one member shall have one vote in all matters to be considered by the general meeting”, allows the statute 
to assign a multiple vote, but the number of votes of one member may be more than ten times the number of votes of another 
member only in a co-operative in whose rules it is stipulated that the majority of members are to be co-operatives or other 
legal persons. Even more general is the provision of Sec. 56, para. 1, Maltese law n° XXX/2001, stating that each member has a 
vote, unless the statute provides otherwise. 
39 See art. 59: “each member of an SCE shall have one vote, regardless of the number of shares he holds”. 
40 The 2nd ICA principle (“Democratic member control”) states that “Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by 
their members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected 
representatives  are  accountable  to  the  membership.  In  primary  co-operatives  members  have  equal  voting  rights  (one 
member, one vote) and  co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner”. The 4th ICA principle 
(“Autonomy  and  independence”),  states  that  “Co-operatives  are  autonomous,  self-help  organisations  controlled  by  their 
members. If they enter into agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external 
sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy”. 
41 According to the 2nd ICA principle: “In primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) 




42  But on this point, as we shall see, Italian law seem s to depart from other 
European national legislation as well as the SCE Regulation. 
Firstly, the statute of an Italian law co-operative may assign more votes to a member 
that is a legal entity (a co -operative or other legal forms of organisation) , with a 
maximum of five, in relation to the capital held or the number of its members (art. 
2538, para. 3, c.c.).
43 
 
This is not an unusual exception and can be easily explained by the need to adapt the 
democratic  principle  to  secondary  co -operation  (even  though,  i n  Italian  law,  this 
exception could also apply to primary co -operatives comprising both individuals and 
co-operatives or other organisations), as already envisaged by the 4
th ICA principle. 
Indeed, if a co-operative is formed of co-operatives (or other organisations) and one 
of them has more members than the others, it seems more democratic and conforms 
more  closely  to  the  principle  “one  member,  one  vote”  that  this  co-operative  is 
awarded extra-votes,  even  considering  that the  law  limits them  to five.  It  is  more 
difficult, on the other hand, to justify the same rule when the statutory criterion for 
awarding more votes is not based on membership as above,  but on the capital held, 
unless we assume (but this argument would be very weak) that the amount of capital 
is  a  sign  of  the  size  of  the  co-operative  in  terms  of  its  members.  In  allowing  the 
statutory  use  of  this  criterion  of  vote  attribution,  Italian  law  follows  the  SCE 
Regulation on this point.
44 
 
Secondly, the co-operative‟s statute may allocate and determine votes in proportion 
to the mutual exchange, that is, the transactions between the member and the co-
operative. But this exception is possible only in co-operatives among entrepreneurs 




This is a more significant exception, given that it is not limited to secondary co -
operatives and meets a different limit: indeed, each member, to whom more votes 
have been assigned under this rule, cannot have more than 10% of  the total votes in 
                                                 
42 Among the national laws on co-operatives examined in this paper, only Hungarian law does not present exceptions to this 
rule. 
43 Partially different provisions can be found in other European national laws. See Art. 9, para. 2, French law n° 1775/47, 
which provides that in a secondary co -operative a multiple vote can be assigned only on the basis of the number of the 
members of the comprising co-operative; Art. 26, para. 2, Spanish law n° 27/99, allows, in primary co -operatives, a multiple 
vote in favour of co-operatives, companies controlled by co-operatives and public entities: the multiple vote shall be assigned 
in proportion to the quantity of mutual activity and faces the limit of 1/3 of total votes; para. 6 of the same law deals, on the 
other hand, with voting in secondary co -operatives, providing that the statute may assign a vote proportional to the 
participation in mutual activity and/or the number of members of the comprising co -operative (with the limit of 1/3 of the 
total votes or 40% if the co-operative has only three members); Sec. 38, para. 2, Norwegian law of 29 June 2007, allows the 
statutes to stipulate, in a secondary co-operative, that the votes are to be divided according to membership figures or the 
geographical area to which the primary co-operative belongs, but one member may not have a majority of the votes in the 
enterprise; the Portuguese co-operative code, law n° 51/96, limits the rule “one member, one vote” to primary co-operatives. 
44 See Art. 59, para. 2, SCE Regulation: “In SCEs the majority of which are co-operatives, if the law of the Member State in 
which the SCE has its registered office so permits, the statutes may provide for the number of votes to be determined in 
accordance with the members’ participation in the co-operative activity including participation in the capital of the SCE 
and/or the number of members of each comprising entity”. 
45 Art. 26, para. 4, Spanish law n° 27/99, permits the multiple vote only in agricultural, service and transport co-operatives, in 
proportion to the quantity of mutual activity and with the limit of five votes or 1/3 of the total votes for each preferred 
member (but for multiple voting in co-operatives for land exploitation see art. 26, para. 5); Sec. 38, para. 2, Norwegian law of 
29 June 2007, allows the statutes to stipulate that members may have several votes if the votes are divided among the 
members according to their trade with the enterprise (but one member may not have a majority of the votes in the 
enterprise). 
For the SCE Regulation, see Art. 59, para. 2, according to which “if the law of the Member State in which the SCE has its 
registered office  so permits, the statutes may provide for a member to have a number of votes determined by his/her 
participation in the co-operative activity other than by way of capital contribution. This attribution shall not exceed five votes 
or 30% of total voting rights, whichever is the lower”.   15 
 
 
each assembly, and all these preferred members together cannot have more than 1/3 
of the total votes in each assembly. 
 
Considering this exception, the democratic principle seems to have been reinterpreted 
by  the  Italian  reform  (at  least  with  regard  to  co-operatives  made  up  of 
entrepreneurs), in the sense that it only forbids the control of the co-operative by one 
member or a category of members, but does not prescribe that each member have 
equal voting rights. Voting is not linked to membership per se (pure personal criterion 
of vote assignment), but directly to the degree of the interest each member has in 
mutuality (mutualistic criterion of vote assignment). 
 
Nevertheless,  this  evaluation  has  to  take  into  account,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the 
greater voting power is linked to the member‟s interest in mutuality and not in the 
remuneration  of  capital,  and  on  the  other,  that  this  exception  applies  only  to  co-
operatives  among  entrepreneurs,  where  the  need  to  connect  the  voice  of  each 
member to the financial risk she/he faces by participating in a co-operative may be 
more urgent.
46 In a co-operative where, for example, new investments are required, 
members  facing  this  issue  could  show  a  positive  or  negative  attitude  towards 
investing, depending on the type and aim of their involvement in the activity of the 
co-operative. Therefore, distributing voting rights in relation and in proportion to the 
involvement of each member in the co-operative‟s business might be a way to prevent 
conflicts among members in co-operatives where membership is not homogenous (the 
alternative being either not setting up or dissolving a co-operative). 
 
Thirdly, the co-operative‟s statute may determine voting rights in the election of the 
supervisory body in proportion either to the capital held or mutual exchanges (art. 
2543, para. 2, c.c.).
47 
 
This is a different exception if compared to the previous, as: 
  it does not apply only to co-operatives made up of entrepreneurs, but all co-
operatives; 
  it only applies to the appointment of the supervisory body; 
  the  criterion  of  determination  may  be  capitalistic  (the  amount  of  the  capital 
held). 
 
Nevertheless, perhaps this exception has been provided for the same reasons as the 
previous.  It  can  be  a  solution  to  the  problems  arising  in  co-operatives  with 
unhomogenous  membership,  therefore  being  an  incentive  to  set  up  a  co-operative 
even  under  this  condition.  On  the  other  hand,  as  to  the  capitalistic  criterion  of 
determination, the fact that the exception regards only the election of the supervisory 
body reduces the risk of undermining the social function of the co-operative structure, 
even though a departure from the principle of democracy is evident in this respect. 
Finally, the statute of a co-operative may assign a multiple vote to investor members: 
this  point  will  be  addressed  later,  when  the  paper  discusses  co-operative  finance 
solutions. 
 
Concluding  on  this  point,  it  may  be  that  the  single  vote  is  not  only  the  main 
characteristic of co-operatives all over the world, but – as has been argued – “one 
member, one vote” can find an economic rationale by taking account of the typical 
                                                 
46 However, other laws do not limit this exception to co-operatives among entrepreneurs: see Sec. 38, para. 2, Norwegian law 
of 29 June 2007, and Art. 59, para. 2, SCE Regulation.  
47 A similar provision cannot be found in other European national laws, but of course, if the law allows the statute to deviate 
from the rule “one member, one vote”, then a statute could provide a rule like this.   16 
 
 
aim of a co-operative. Indeed, the single vote “favours the objective of production and 
allocation of wealth to members […]. It eliminates transaction costs associated with 
the  need  to  consider  continuously  what  the  contribution  of  each  member  to  the 
common  wealth  is  […].  It  favours  the  manifestation  of  individual  preferences, 
inasmuch as it favours the preferences of the average member, rather than those of 
the marginal member […]. In particular, it contributes to the implementation, so to 
speak,  of  an  “internal”  market,  inasmuch  as  it  favours  and  promotes  mutual 
exchanges, rather than the remuneration of the subscribed capital.”
48 
 
However,  even  though  the  provision  of  the  single  vote  in  co-operatives  promotes 
mutual exchanges and therefore the fulfilment of their aim, it makes the creation of a 
“market of control” of a co-operative impossible, as the control cannot be acquired by 
those who value it more, given that the governance of the enterprise is based on the 
principle  “one  member,  one  vote.”
49  In  light  of  this,  it  may  be  appropriate  and 
effective  to  depart  from  the  main  rule  if  the  exception  could  ensure  the  best 
accomplishment of the co-operative aim (as in co-operatives with an unhomogenous 
membership,  in  terms  of  individual  contribution  to  the  co-operative‟s  activity), 
preventing,  at  the  same  time,  the  co-operative  from  being  controlled  by  only  one 
member or category of members. This could be the case of the rule allowing voting 
rights  to  be  linked  to  the  quantity  or  quality  of  mutual  exchanges  between  the 
member and its co-operative, but not that of allowing voting rights to be linked to the 
amount of the subscribed capital. It seems that this latter rule cannot be justified in 
light of co-operative  principles, but  only  in  light  of the  profit-making  philosophy  of 
commercial companies. 
 
6.  The  co-operative  governance  structure:  the  three  available  systems  of 
administration and control 
 
We cannot understand the importance of the Italian reform on this point if we do not 
review the repealed provisions. Before the reform, a co-operative statute had limited, 
or rather, no freedom to determine the system of administration and control of the co-
operative. Therefore, the co-operative structure could only conform with the so-called 
“tripartite”  (or  three-tier)  system  of  administration  and  control.  There  was, 
furthermore, a strong insistence on the principle of co-operative self-management, to 
the extent that the law forbade a co-operative to appoint non-member directors (thus, 
the  only  way  to  employ  professional  managers  was  to  admit  them  as  technical 
members first). 
 
In order to permit a more efficient and effective management of a co-operative, the 
recent reform enables co-operative statutes to choose among three different systems 
of administration and control: the so-called “tripartite” (“three-tier”), “dualistic” (two-
tier”) and “monistic” (“one-tier”) systems. It is worth noting that these options are 
taken  from  the  regulations  governing  the  main  Italian  legal  form  of  for-profit 
enterprise, namely, the “società per azioni” (limited shareholder company), with only 
a  few  adaptations  to  the  co-operative  form.  In  addition,  the  influence  of  the  SCE 
Regulation is also evident, although Italian law models do not exactly correspond to 
those of the SCE Regulation. The default system is the traditional tripartite one, since 
the other methods must be expressly opted for by statutes. It is divided into three 
bodies: the member assembly, the board of directors and the board of supervisors. 
 
                                                 
48 ZOPPINI, Il nuovo diritto delle societ￠ cooperative: un’analisi economica, in Riv. dir. civ., 2004, II, p. 444. 
49 In this sense, ZOPPINI, Il nuovo diritto delle societ￠ cooperative: un’analisi economica, cit., p. 445.   17 
 
 
Among  its  main  ordinary  functions,  the  member  assembly  appoints  and  removes 
directors and supervisors and approves annual accounts. Directors are in charge of 
the management of the company and they may perform all the acts necessary for the 
implementation of the social object (art. 2380 bis, para. 1, c.c.). At least a majority of 
them must be members (therefore, the other directors can be non-members) (art. 
2542, para. 2, c.c.).  
 
Supervisors verify the duties performed by directors, the observance of the legal and 
statutory  rules  governing  their  actions,  as  well  as  their  general  good  faith.  Only 
registered auditors, registered professionals (such as lawyers and notaries), and law 
or  economics  professors  may  be  appointed  as  supervisors  (although  at  least  one 
supervisor must be a registered auditor). 
 
A  co-operative  must  also  appoint  at  least  one  registered  external  auditor  for  the 
specific aim of auditing annual accounts unless the board of supervisors is entirely 
formed  of  registered  auditors,  in  which  case  the  board  of  auditors  can  also  be  in 
charge of this particular function.
50 
 
The one-tier (“monistic” in the Italian civil code) system is not substantially different 
from the three-tier one, except for the following points: 
  supervisors  are  not directly  appointed by  the  assembly,  but  by  the  board  of 
directors  from  among  its  members;  at  least  one  supervisor  must  be  a 
registered  auditor;  supervisors  are  non-operating  members  of  the  board  of 
directors  (they  cannot  manage  the  company)  and  all  of  them  together 
constitute an internal body of the latter (named “auditing committee”); 
  the external audit of accounts is always required. 
This system has been criticised by some Italian scholars, as supervisors are appointed 
by the very persons who have to be supervised. But this criticism is unpersuasive, 
since, after all, members identify supervisors, although indirectly, through their first 
appointment as directors. By way of contrast, this could be an effective administration 
system, because, on the one hand, it favours the circulation of information between 
administrators and supervisors, both being part of the same body, and on the other 
hand always requires an internal and external audit (which can be, however, absent in 
smaller co-operatives adopting the three-tier system).
51 
 
If compared to the corresponding provisions of the SCE, apart from nomenclature (the 
bodies  of  directors  is  called  “administrative  organ”  there),  we  find  an  important 
difference, given the fact that in the SCE Regulation one-tier system the requirement 
for an internal auditing committee is absent.
52 
 
The two-tier (“dualistic” in the Italian civil code) system is divided into three bodies: 
the member assembly, the supervisory body and the management body. Under this 
system, the assembly of members has fewer functions than in both of the others. It 
does not appoint (not even indirectly) managers (as in the one-tier system), it does 
not approve annual accounts, nor is it in charge of other central issues, such as the 
                                                 
50 Under the three-tier system, smaller co-operatives (whose capital is not greater than € 120,000, and do not simultaneously 
go beyond two of the following limits: - statement of assets: € 4,400,000; - proceeds: € 8,800.000; - 50 employees on average, 
and  do  not  issue  “non-participative”  financial  instruments)  are  not  obliged  to  appoint  either  a  supervisory  body  or  an 
external auditor (see Art. 2543, para. 1; 2477, para. 2, 3; 2435 bis, para. 1, c.c.). 
One must note that an SCE could adopt a system similar to that of the Italian three-tier, by exercising the option laid down in 
art. 37, para. 2. 
51 n 48 above 
52 See PRESTI, Le fonti della disciplina e l’organizzazione interna della societ￠ cooperative europea, in FICI & GALLETTI (eds.), La 
società cooperativa europea, Trento, 2006, p. 84.   18 
 
 
decision  on  the  recourse  advanced  by  third  persons  against  the  denial  by 
administrators  of  their  request  to  become  members;  the  approval  of  general 
regulations  on  the  mutual  relationship  between  the  co-operative  and  its  members; 
etc. 
 
The  supervisory  body  is  the  central  body  of  this  system  of  administration.  It  is 
appointed by the assembly from among its members, is in charge of the election of 
managers, controls their conduct, approves annual accounts (and is in charge of those 
key decisions which we referred to before as not being under the responsibility of the 
assembly),  and  may  also  be  given  by  statute  the  “high  administrative”  power  to 
determine strategic, industrial and financial plans of the enterprise. The supervisory 
body is formed of at least three persons, one of whom must be a registered auditor. 
The management body is formed of at least two persons, also non- members of the 
co-operative.  It  manages  the  enterprise  with  the  same  powers  as  the  body  of 
directors  under  the  three-tier  system.  Under  this  system  the  external  audit  of 
accounts is always required. 
 
The  Italian  law  two-tier  system  differs  from  that  of  the  SCE  Regulation  in  that 
pursuant to the latter, the assembly is not deprived of the power to make important 
decisions regarding the enterprise, as it is in the former in favour of the supervisory 
body. 
 
The  reason  for  this  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  without  making  substantial 
modifications,  Italian  co-operative  law  on  this  point  adopted  a  system  of  company 
administration  provided  by  the  civil  code  for  a  limited  shareholder  company  more 
suited  to  widely  held  large  companies  (including  listed)  in  which,  furthermore, 
shareholders  are  not  necessarily  interested  in  the  company  business,  but  rather 
returns on investment. Thus, the two-tier system is the system which, more than the 
others,  strongly  divides  property  and  control  of  the  enterprise,  in  the  sense  that 
members do not control the enterprise, as control is in the hands of the members of 
the supervisory body and the managers. 
 
Therefore,  one  should  inquire  whether  the  deprivation  of  assembly  power  and  its 
concentration in the hands of few people (supervisors and managers) are compatible 
with co-operative principles, especially with regard to the governance of primary co-
operatives. Indeed, according to the 2
nd ICA principle (“Democratic member control”), 
“co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively 
participate in setting their policies and making decisions”, while the 4
th ICA principle 
(“Autonomy and independence”), states that “co-operatives are autonomous, self-help 
organisations controlled by their members”. In light of these principles, the answer 
would probably be negative. 
 
Even  the  predictable  objection  that  members  in  co-operatives  with  a  large 
membership do not actually participate and exercise their power to control anyway, so 
the Italian two-tier system would not really undermine member participation, seems 
unsound. The fact remains that a co-operative facing this problem could adopt other 
governance  means  which  would  definitely  be  compatible  with  the  co-operative 
principle  of  member  participation,  such  as  mail  or  electronic  voting  or  separate 
assemblies, both provided for by Italian co-operative law.
53 
 
                                                 
53 See, respectively, Art. 2538, para. 6, and 2540, c.c.   19 
 
 
It seems that the straightforward transplant of rules and solutions conceived for non-
co-operative companies can only result in a loss of identity of the co-operative form of 
enterprise, which might be particularly dangerous if we consider that only on the basis 
of  its  particular  features  would  it  be  possible  to  justify  the  special  legal  treatment 
reserved  to  the  co-operative  enterprise  (otherwise  unjustifiable  and  consequently 
unlawful under specific laws, such as European competition law). Instead, we should 
be seeking suitable co-operative solutions to the unique problems a co-operative faces 
(such as that of implementing and ensuring member participation, as well as that of 
undercapitalisation), and not passively imitating other company law patterns. 
 
It  is  surprising  how  Italian  co-operative  law  has  moved  from  a  point  in  which  the 
principle of member control was absolutely mandatory (as mentioned, the law forbade 
the  appointment  of  non-member  managers)  to  a  point  where  this  principle  is  only 
optional (in a co-operative adopting the two-tier system, the only power a member 
has is to appoint supervisors). We may well ask why this has happened. 
 
If  we  consider  the  dualistic  system  together  with  the  above-described  “other”  co-
operative model, the suspicion that for-profit competitors managed to align the co-
operative  enterprise  to  the  for-profit  commercial  enterprise,  thereby  diluting  the 
characteristics of the former, turns out to be legitimate.  
 
7. Co-operative finance solutions 
 
It  is  well  and  universally  known  that  co-operatives  face  a  problem  of 
undercapitalisation, especially due to the irrelevancy of capital in governance (as an 
effect of the democratic principle) and its limited remunerability. At first glance, this 
problem might appear unsolvable, since limited remuneration and democracy are co-
operative principles which identify and distinguish co-operatives among other types of 
companies. Therefore, their weakening could result in a loss of identity for the co-
operative  enterprise.  The  commitment  should  be  to  search  for  solutions  that  are 
compatible with the legal nature of a co-operative, without threatening its identity. 
 
For  this  reason,  one  can  criticise  the  choice  of  Italian  legislators  to  allow  the 
constitution  of  “other”  co-operatives,  because  these  organisations,  though  formally 
named “co-operatives”, are not truly co-operatives in their substance if we identify a 
co-operative through ICA principles. This is not a proper answer to the problem of co-
operative undercapitalisation, since it avoids the problem rather than solving it. 
 
One  must  also  consider  that,  if  co-operatives  do  indeed  encounter  a  problem  of 
undercapitalisation, normally they do not face a problem of lack of assets (therefore, 
undercapitalisation constitutes a problem particularly in the starting-up phase of the 
enterprise). This is partly due to the legal obligation to direct part of their profits to 
reserves. Italian law obliges co-operatives to earmark 30% of total annual profits for 
the legal reserve, irregardless of the amount of the legal reserve. 
 
The  compulsory  contribution  to  reserves  is  a  solution  to  the  undercapitalisation 
problem  in  line  with  co-operative  principles,  as  it  reinforces  the  non-distribution 
constraint and the solidarity aspect of a co-operative (solidarity among co-operators, 
from old co-operators toward new co-operators). 
 
Another external solution is offered by the co-operative movement, in terms of co-
operation among co-operatives (sometimes in Italy this is called “system mutuality”).   20 
 
 
Italian  law  co-operatives  are  obliged  to  allocate  3%  of  total  annual  profits  to  the 
mutual funds for the promotion and development of co-operation established (under 
article 11 of law n° 59/92) and headed by the representative organisations of the co-
operative movement (the aforementioned five inter-sectorial organisations) with the 
aim  of  promoting  and  financing  the  development  of  new  co-operatives  in  various 
manners, as well as through the participation in their capital as founders. In the event 
of dissolution of the co-operative enterprise, its assets have to be allocated to these 
funds,  (except for “other” co-operatives). 
 
This solution also conforms to co-operative principles, especially the 6
th ICA principle 
(“co-operation among co-operatives”). It does not threaten the co-operative identity, 
but  strengthens  it,  mostly  in  terms  of  its  solidarity  aspect.  The  solutions  to  the 
problem of undercapitalisation presented above are traditional solutions, as the first 
(compulsory contribution of profits to a legal reserve) was already present in the civil 
code of 1942 and the second (compulsory contribution of profits to mutual funds) was 
introduced in 1992. 
 
The  most  recent  reform  of  Italian  law  sought  to  reinforce  co-operative  finance  by 
other new means. In this regard, the general rule is found in article 2526, para. 1, 
c.c., which states that “the statute may provide for the issue of financial instruments, 
in accordance with the regulation on limited shareholder companies”. 
 
The freedom given to co-operatives to draft their statutes accordingly is very wide. 
Indeed, statutes may define financial and administrative rights of financial instrument 
holders (art. 2526, para. 2, c.c.). As to the financial rights, even in “mainly mutual” 
co-operatives, financial instrument holders can be remunerated without limit (the only 
limit  in  “mainly  mutual”  co-operatives  regards  financial  instruments  held  by  user-
members).
54  As to the administrative rights, the law only sets the limit that the 
category of financial instrument holders cannot have more than 1/3 of the total votes 
in the member assembly (art. 2526, para. 2, c.c.). The right to elect administrators 
could also be awarded to financial instrument holders, but with the maximum of 1/3 
of total administrators (art. 2542, para. 4, c.c.). 
 
Beyond this, the concrete characteristics of issued financial instruments will depend on 
the statute: a co -operative may issue equity -financial instruments (and therefore 
admit investor members), debt -financial instruments (as, for example, bonds), or 
hybrids  (as,  for  exampl e,  participative  bonds,  that  is,  bonds  related  to  the 
performance of the enterprise, or shares awarding a minimum return, regardless of 
the performance of the enterprise, but not voting rights).
55 
 
Perhaps, the most important case is that of investor (non-user) members. It is known 
that the opportunity for a co-operative to admit members who are only interested in 
the remuneration of the capital (and not in mutuality) has long been discussed.
56 The 
question is whether the presence of a non -user (investor) member can turn out to 
hinder the co-operative institutional “mutual purpose”. 
                                                 
54 But not using reserves, which are legally indivisible. 
55 Along this line, art. 64 of the SCE Regulation provides that  “an SCE’s statute may provide for the issue of securities other than 
shares, or debentures the holders of which are to have no voting rights”, and whose acquisition does not confer the status of 
member. But for certain types of financial instruments already provided by the laws considered in this paper, see for example 
Italian “co-operative participative shares” (Art 5, Law  59/1992); French “investiment co-operative certificates” (Art 19-sexdecies, 
Law n° 1775/47); Portuguese “investment bonds” (Art. 26, Código Cooperativo); Spanish “bonds” and “participative bonds” (Art. 54, 
Law n° 27/99); and, more recently, Finnish “supplementary shares” (Chap. 11, Law n° 1488/2001). 
56 Not accidentally, Art. 14, para. 1, SCE Regulation, in regulating this point, refers back to national laws, stating that, in an SCE, 




The author proposes that if the administrative rights of investor members are limited 
by mandatory provisions of the law (as under Italian law or the SCE Regulation),
57 
then the pr esence of investor members will not undermine the co -operative aim. 
Nevertheless, this is not the key issue. Italy first introduced this type of finance 
solution, that is, investor members, in 1992 (art. 4, law n° 59/92), and since then (at 
least, according to the common understanding in the co -operative field) this option 
has not been exploited largely outside co -operative investors, such as mutual funds, 
that  is  to  say,  investors  sharing  the  same  view  and  ideas .
58  In  other  words, 
membership has not been attractive for potential investors who are not a part of the 
co-operative movement. This is understandable in light of the fact that potential 
investors in a co-operative do not have a degree of power (to control) proportionate 
to the amount of the investment and the financial risk. Insofar as they cannot control 
the co-operative, profit seeking investors act rationally if they prefer to invest in a non 
co-operative company. 
 
Therefore,  co-operative  finance  remains  mostly  dependent  on  the  co -operative 
movement and its capacity to create and implement new solutions for co -operative 
finance. One of these might be the recourse to employee (whether members or not) 
financial  participation  plans  (in  the  form  of  profit -sharing  or  especially  share -





The concept of “co-operative”, which stems from the Italian reform of co-operative 
law  is  twofold,  due  to  the  distinction  between  “mainly  mutual”  and  “other”  co-
operatives, this differentiation being the main characteristic of Italian co-operative law 
after the reform. 
 
As a result, a company acting under the name of “co-operative” (both “mainly mutual” 
and “other”) may: 
  not  operate  with  its  members,  but  exclusively  or  predominantly  with  non-
members; 
  remunerate member capital and financial instruments without limits; 
  distribute its reserves and assets to members; 
  devolve  its  assets  to  members  in  the  event  of  member  withdrawal  and  co-
operative dissolution. 
 
The  “other”  co-operative  “new form” or “sub-type”  of co-operative  –  although  it  is 
subject to the same governance rules as the “mainly mutual” form and is not eligible 
for tax benefits – is an historical anomaly and can only be considered either as an 
improper solution to the financial weakness of co-operatives, or as a barrier to the 
conversion of existing non-mutual co-operatives into for-profit shareholder companies. 
As a solution to co-operative finance concerns, this would be an improper approach 
insofar as it avoids the problem of undercapitalisation rather than solving it. “Other” 
co-operatives, though formally named “co-operatives”, are not truly co-operatives in 
their substance, at least if we identify a co-operative through ICA principles, as well as 
                                                 
57 The SCE Regulation provides that investor members may not together have more than 25% of total voting rights. 
58 According to the common understanding in the co -operative sector, this conclusion is valid also for France and Spain, 
whose laws embody similar provisions on investor members. 
59 On this topic, see FICI, ‘Financial participation by employees in co-operatives in Italy’,  (2004) Journal of co-operative studies,  
16 ff.   22 
 
 
the principles arising by other national laws (the only co-operative feature “other” co-
operatives possess is governance). 
 
Perhaps the concrete reason (the historical contingency) for this legislative choice was 
to  prevent  many  (normally  large)  co-operatives,  which  used  to  operate  de  facto 
without  limit with non-members, from being excluded from the co-operative sector 
after the reform came into force, particularly if we consider that “other” co-operatives 
may convert into a for-profit type of company (while “mainly mutual” co-operatives 
are not allowed to), but in this case are obliged to devolve their assets to the mutual 
funds. 
 
If  this  holds  true,  one  can  question  whether  the  “other”  co-operative  form  may 
threaten  and  undermine  the  image  of “real” co-operatives.
60  Nevertheless, perhaps 
this  concern  would  not  be  completely  relevant,  as  the  category  of  “other”  co-
operatives is destined to exhaust itself. Generally speaking, it is doubtful that there 
are any incentives to set up new “other” co-operatives which would be subject to the 
same governance rules (including public control) as the “mainly mutual” ones, but not 
eligible  for  tax  benefits.  Co-operative  governance  rules  make  sense  and  are 
economically rational only in the presence of a company with a non-lucrative purpose. 
Therefore,  persons  interested  in  profit-making  and  not  in  mutuality  can  find  more 
suitable legal forms than the co-operative for the establishment of their enterprise. 
The second main characteristic of the reform relates to the “one member, one vote” 
rule, that is, co-operative democracy.  
 
Italian  law  has  confirmed  democracy  as  a  general  rule,  but  has  provided  a  few 
exceptions to it. Some of them are easily understandable in light of the mutual aim of 
the co-operative and have an economic rationale. This holds true for the division of 
votes in proportion to the number of members of the comprising organisation, or to 
the volume of mutual exchanges (where voting is linked to the degree of the interest 
each member has in mutuality). In particular, when membership is not homogenous, 
distributing voting rights in proportion to the involvement of each member in the co-
operative‟s business might be a way to prevent conflicts among members, avoiding 
that a new co-operative is not set up or that an existing one dissolves.
61  
 
On the other hand, other exceptions appear to be in contrast with the democratic 
principle, insofar as they adopt a capitalistic criterion for vote allocation (capital held 
as a criterion for awarding more votes). 
 
Considering the overall regulation  of voting, the democratic principle seems to have 
been reinterpreted by the Italian reform, in the sense that it only prevents a co -
operative  from  being  (formally)  controlled  by  one  member  or  one  category  of 
members, but it does not state that each member shall have a vote. 
 
The reform has allowed co -operatives to adopt two other governance systems  in 
addition to the traditional three-tier one (which remains the default system). The one-
tier system can be considered an effective governance system, as, on the one hand, it 
                                                 
60 Recently, in the editorial of an important Italian review, it has been affirmed: “It is strongly unpopular to be said, but it is 
our convincement that having accepted the legal ratification of the distinction between mainly mutual co-operatives and non-
mainly mutual co-operatives has been a great mistake, whose consequences are not been well considered yet” (see BONELLA, 
‘Orgoglio e pregiudizio’, (2007) 4 Rivista della cooperazione 4). 
61 Nevertheless, this incentive structure of voting raises a question which cannot be dealt with in the paper, namely, whether 
by doing so the co-operative allows member interest to prevail over the co -operative interest, and individual utility over 
solidarity among co-operators. This point raises more general questions, namely, “what is the relationship between mutuality 
and solidarity”, “in what does the social function of a co-operative consist?”   23 
 
 
favours the circulation of information between administrators and supervisors, and on 
the other hand always requires an internal and external audit (which may be absent in 
the three-tier system). 
 
By  way  of  contrast,  the  two-tier  system  appears  to  contrast  with  co-operative 
principles, since it strongly divides property and control of the enterprise, limiting the 
power  of  the  assembly  of  members.  This  holds  true  also  in  the  case  of  large  co-
operatives where member participation is not effective. The two-tier system, again, 
avoids the problem rather than solving it, inasmuch as it cancels participation rather 
than promoting it. Other governance means are available for co-operatives, which not 
only are compatible with co-operative principles, but favour member participation as 
well,  such  as  mail  or  electronic  voting  and  separate  assemblies,  both  provided  by 
Italian co-operative law. 
 
The  finance  issue  in  a  co-operative  is  fundamental  and  topical.  As  has  been 
opportunely  pointed  out,  “co-operatives  in  Canada  and  around  the  world  are  not 
immune  to the  challenges  of making  their  way  in  a  global  economy  dominated  by 
investor-owned companies … Inadequate provision for capital needs has driven some 
co-op businesses to convert to investor ownership.”
62 This is definitely true and raises 
the question “Which co-operative finance?”. 
 
New Italian co-operative law allows co-operatives to issue financial instruments in the 
manner  and  with  the  characteristics  (with  regard  to  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
financial instrument holders) provided for by statute, with the only limitation being 
that  investor  members  may  not  have  more  than  1/3  of  the  total  votes  in  each 
assembly. Therefore the success of this new form of finance depends on the capacity 
of co-operatives to create adequate financial instruments. 
 
The Italian experience of investor members (“soci sovventori”) has shown that co-
operative finance remains inside the co-operative movement, as mostly only mutual 
funds, co-operative banks, secondary and tertiary co-operatives have been investor 
members in co-operatives so far. Indeed, where control is possible, it is economically 
rational  that  non  co-operative  investors  prefer  to  invest  in  a  non  co-operative 
enterprise. Therefore, finance solutions should be elaborated not only by the single 
co-operative,  but  by  the  co-operative  system  as  well,  and  this  increases  the 
importance of a co-operative being part of such a system. 
 
Italian law recognises and promotes in different ways the activity of mutual funds run 
by representative organisations of co-operatives with the specific aim to promote the 
setting  up  of  new  co-operatives.  But  more  general  and  sophisticated  solutions  are 
needed,  also  by  implementing  the  freedom  given  by  the  law  to  issue  financial 
instruments and determining their contents. From this perspective, the establishment 
of  a  general  stable  system  of  employee  financial  participation  schemes  in  co-
operatives (in the form of profit-sharing or share-ownership) may be an opportunity 
for the development of co-operative finance which the co-operative movement might 
definitely consider. 
                                                 






Tables and figure 
 
 
Table 1 – Co-operatives enterprises in the ISTAT Census of 2001 
Number   % on the total*   Jobs   % on the total* 
53,393  1.2  935,239  5.8  
Source: Zamagni-Zamagni, La cooperazione, Bologna, 2008, pp.85 
 
Table 2 – Co-operative enterprises in 2005 
Number   % on the total  
70,397  1.38 
Source: Unioncamere, Secondo rapporto sulle imprese co-operative, 2006 
 
Table 3 – The Italian co-operative movement in 2005 
   Number  Turnover 
(billion €) 
Members  Jobs 
Legacoop  15,200  50  7,500,000  414,000 
Confcooperative  19,200  57  2,878,000  466,000 
UNCI   7,825  3  558,000  129,000 
AGCI   5,768  6  439,000  70,000 
Unicoop   1,910  0.3  15,000  20,000 
Non-members   21,561  3  100,000  150,000 
              
TOTAL  71,464  119  11,490,000  
(1 in 5 IT 
citizens) 
1,249,000 
Source: Zamagni-Zamagni, cit., pp.89 
 
Table 4 – The co-operative register (data at 15th January 2006) 
   Number   % 
“Mainly mutual” co-ops 
(16.5 % social co-ops) 
58,236  93.5 
“Other” co-ops 
(31.2 % worker co-ops; 16.1 % housing co-ops) 
3,821  6.2 
Not subjected co-ops  196  0.3 
        
TOTAL  62,253  100 
Source: Unioncamere, Secondo rapporto sulle imprese cooperative, cit. 
 
Table 5 – Co-operatives in Europe in 2008 
Number   Members  Jobs 
250,000  163,000,000  
(1 in 3 EU 
Citizens) 
5,400,000 












Table 6 – Mainly mutual and other co-operatives 
   Mainly  mutual 
co-ops 
Other co-ops  
Minimum operations with members  yes  no 
Limited remuneration on the capital  
(and on financial instruments) subscribed by 
members 
yes  no 
Distribution of reserves to user-members  no  yes 
Devolution of assets to mutual funds in case of 
dissolution 
yes  no 
Conversion into a for-profit company  no  yes 
(but  assets 
devolution  to 
mutual funds) 




Table 7 – Voting rights. Exceptions to the „one member, one vote‟ rule 
Exception  Beneficiary  Criterion   Limit  
Art. 2538, para. 3, 
c.c. 
Legal entity  - capital held 
- number of 
members 
5 votes 
Art. 2538, para. 4, 
c.c. 
Members of a co-
operative among 
entrepreneurs 
In proportion to 
mutual 
exchanges 
- each: 10% of 
the total votes 
- together: 1/3 of 
the total votes 
Art. 2543, para. 2, 
c.c. 
All members of all 
co-operatives 






Art. 2526, para. 2, 
c.c. 
Investor members  Law is silent on 
this point   
each or together: 
1/3 of the total 
votes 
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